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Respondents Callie Cowling, Marie Grubbs, Marguerite
Wilson, Robert Baird, Ed Baird, Jr., and the Adra Baird Estate
(collectively the "Bairds") submit the following Answer to Celsius Energy Company's ("Celsius") Petition for Rehearing,
I.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This case of first impression was commenced in the
early spring of 1985 when Celsius petitioned the Board of Oil,
Gas & Mining ("Board") for a pooling order for the Ucolo Well No.
2, requiring the payment of royalties retroactive to the date of
the well's first production, i.e., April, 1983. This petition
was premised upon a demand by the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM").

The core issue in these proceedings has been the appro-

priate effective date of the pooling order.
Since early 1985, these proceedings have been heard by
the Board twice, by the Utah State District Court, and by the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah.

Both the District and

Supreme Courts have ruled in favor of the Bairds and have established their entitlement to royalties that have, for seven years,
been withheld from them.-

Now, faced with this final judicial

determination, Celsius petitions the Court for a rehearing, not
to re-examine this Court's ruling on the merits, but rather to

1/

These royalties have been escrowed and now amount to the
approximate sum of four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000).
-2-

send this case back to the Boardcess over again.

to start the protracted pro-

Such action is not justified by the record, is

not supported by the law, and would not comport with any concept
of fairness.
Celsius bases its petition for rehearing on two
grounds:
(1)

that the Board must be permitted to determine if

there are "special circumstances1' that would preclude application of the Court's decision in this case; and
(2)

that the Board should be given the opportunity to

determine whether BLM has waived its rights to share in the
production from the subject well.
Both of these questions were ripe for determination by
the Board in 1985.

These questions were either ruled upon by the

Board, or were not timely presented to the Board.

Neither of the

stated "grounds for rehearing" is anything more than an attempt
to obtain, after seven years, another administrative rehearing of
this matter.

A grant of the Celsius petition would be accompa-

nied by the needless but inevitable delay in the payment of royalties long since due and owing.

2/

The Board was given the opportunity, but declined, to join
in the petition for rehearing.
- 3 -

II.
ARGUMENT
As indicated, this was a case of first impression
before the Board.

While numerous other states had addressed the

question of retroactive pooling orders, the Utah Board had not.
There was no Utah precedential indication as to how the Board
should rule in this matter.
The issue was addressed twice by the Board through
evidentiary hearings; once pursuant to Celsius1 petition and once
pursuant to the Bairds1 petition for rehearing.

Following its

initial ruling permitting retroactive pooling to the date of
first production, the Board agreed to rehear the matter.

Inter-

estingly, one of the bases for the Bairds' Petition for Rehearing
was that the Board should consider "special circumstances" that
made the Board's initial ruling unreasonable and unjust. Specifically, the Bairds argued that BLM had waived its right to and
was estopped from claiming retroactive royalties.

Evidence in

support of these claims was submitted to the Board.
A.

CELSIUS' CLAIM OF POTENTIAL "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" DOES NOT
JUSTIFY OR PERMIT THE REMAND OF THIS MATTER TO THE BOARD.
Celsius, after seven years of proceedings, requests the

Court to remand this case to the Board for the purpose of determining if there are any "special circumstances" that would make

- 4 -

this Court's decision unjust or unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.
The phrase "special circumstances" is a term of art
3/
.
4/
employed by both the Board- and this Court- that is apparently
derived from the statutory requirement that the pooling orders of
the Board be "just and reasonable."
(1988).

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5)

This requirement was in full force and effect in 1985

when the Board was first presented with this matter.
As noted, this has been a case of first impression.
The Bairds presented to the Board evidence and argument that
"special circumstances" existed that dictated a pooling order
that did not go back to the date of first production.

Celsius

In its initial ruling in this case the Board ruled as
follows:
Thus, the general rule which we stated which makes
pooling effective as of first production should apply
in the absence of special circumstances which would
make pooling as of such date not just and reasonable.
We find no such circumstance in this case.
This Court ruled:
With respect to wildcat or exploratory wells, however, where no preexisting field-wide spacing order has
been entered, the rule is that a pooling order should
be effective no earlier than the date of a spacing
order, unless there are special circumstances which
would make it just and equitable for an order to be
retroactive to protect correlative rights established
by the Act from inequitable or overreaching conduct.
Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 177 Utah Adv.
Rep. 6, 11-12.
- 5 -

did not, but had the opportunity to, argue the existence of "special circumstances" that would dictate a pooling order back to
the date of first production.

Celsius elected not to present

"special circumstances" evidence notwithstanding the fact that
Celsius relied upon the case of Farmers Irrigation District v.
Schumacher, 194 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1972).-'

The Farmers case was

cited by Celsius at all levels of these proceedings.

It held

that a pooling order retroactive to the date of first production
was appropriate if there were facts that would equitably dictate
such a result.
If Celsius had "special circumstances" to be considered
by the Board, it should, as did the Bairds, have raised them
before the Board in 1985.

Celsius cannot now seek remand to the

Board for consideration of "special circumstances," if any, that
it could have raised initially.

This failure by Celsius to raise

issues that were ripe in 1985 before the Board precludes Celsius
from raising them now.

See, Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board

of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 775 P.2d 439

1/

In Farmers the adjacent property owners gave the owners of
the land upon which the subject well was located notice of
its claim to a proportionate share of production immediately
after production commenced. The well-owners then contested
the adjacent owner's ownership of land resulting in substantial delay. Following a judicially determined right of ownership, and based upon the delay occasioned because of the
title dispute, the court allowed retroactive pooling.
- 6 -

(Utah App. 1989); Gibson v, Board of Review of the Industrial
Conunission of Utah, 707 P.2d 675 (Utah 1985); Pease v. the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984).
In short, to allow Celsius to seek a rehearing ab
initio from the Board on the question of "special circumstances"
is not permitted by law; to do so under the guise that the Board
might find something is unfair.
B.

A REHEARING BY THE BOARD TO DETERMINE IF BLM WAIVED ITS
RIGHTS IS NOT JUSTIFIED.
Celsius' second ground for its Petition for Rehearing

is based upon an illusory argument. Celsius argues that the
Court's decision is based upon a determination that BLM waived
its rights to royalties, and that the Board was never presented
with evidence on this issue.

Neither contention has any basis in

fact.
There is nothing in this Court's opinion that would
suggest that it is based upon a waiver by BLM.

The Court's deci-

sion is based upon a construction of statutory law.

The theory

behind the Court's decision rests upon the application of a modified rule of capture, and not upon the conduct of the parties.
The only mention of BLM conduct is in conjunction with the
Court's discussion of whether the Bairds' conduct was in any way
"inequitable or overreaching."

In this regard the Court held:

With respect to wildcat or exploratory wells, however, where no preexisting field-wide spacing order has
- 7-

been entered, the rule is that a pooling order should
be effective no earlier than the date of a spacing
order, unless there are special circumstances which
would make it just and equitable for an order to be
retroactive to protect correlative rights established
by the Act from equitable or overreaching conduct.
Thus, if the operator of a successful wildcat well
wrongfully delays petitioning for a spacing order or
wrongfully prolongs the hearing process, the Board may
make a pooling order retroactive to the date of the
application for a spacing order, or possibly to a prior
time.
Here, the Bairds cannot be charged with any kind
of wrongful delay . . . .
Furthermore, the BLM was
aware that the Ucolo No. 2 well had been completed in a
known geologic formation, providing it with some basis
for surmising that the Ucolo No. 2 well might drain gas
from under the BLM tract. Under those circumstances,
the BLM might have taken some action, but it did not.
In all events, the Bairds did not engage in any inequitable conduct or do anything to delay entry of the
spacing order.
Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 177 Utah Adv. Rep. 6,
11-12.
Nevertheless, Celsius argues that there was "no evidence" presented to the Board on the question of waiver.

Specif-

ically, Celsius contends:
In this case there is no evidence in the record
that the BLM had knowledge of any existing right to
share in production during the relevant period. There
is certainly no evidence of any intention, on the part
of the BLM, to waive any such right. The Court's conclusion that the BLM waived its right was mistaken. To
allow the parties to present evidence on this issue,
this case should be remanded to the Board for further
proceedings.
Celsius Petition for Rehearing at 8.

- 8 -

In point of fact, the question of BLM's possible waiver
was distinctly presented to the Board.

In support of their Peti-

tion for Rehearing before the Board, the Bairds argued that BLM
had, by its delay following knowledge of the possibility that its
land was being drained by the Ucolo No. 2, waived its rights to
retroactive pooling to the date of first production.

The Bairds1

Petition for Rehearing stated:
The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") actually
knew before November 1, 1983 that its land was being
drained by the Ucolo No. 2 well, yet sat back silently
for over a year (until January 23, 1985) before notifying anyone that it claimed a royalty on production from
that well. Documents discovered in BLM files, copies
of which are attached as Exhibits "A" through "D," show
the BLM had actual knowledge of its pooling rights long
prior to its demand letter of January 23, 1985 (Exhibit
"E"). BLM, therefore, waived its right to royalties
prior to that time and is estopped from demanding retroactive royalties.
id. at 2.
The identified exhibits were submitted to the Board
and, consequently, are part of the record before this Court.
Evidence submitted on this question by either Celsius or BLM, if
any, is similarly a part of this record.

Apparently, the Board

rejected the Bairds' waiver argument.
On appeal to this Court, the applicable standard of
review of the Board's decision is "on the record."

Even if this

Court's ruling had been based upon a waiver theory, which it was
not, there is sufficient evidence in the record of a BLM waiver.
- 9 -

Reversal for the purpose of taking additional evidence on this
question is precluded by law.

See, Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v.

Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 775 P.2d
439 (Utah App. 1989); Gibson v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, 707 P.2d 675 (Utah 1985); Pease v. the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984).
III.
CONCLUSION
The Bairds are the individual heirs of Adra Baird.
They have been mired in these proceedings and deprived of their
substantial royalties for seven years.

Celsius asks this Court

to prolong these proceedings further; possibly for an additional
seven years.

The fundamental objective of this exercise has been

to achieve a result that is just and reasonable.

It would be

neither just nor reasonable to remand this case to the Board for
further hearings.

As herein elaborated, the record, the law and

the equities of this case dictate a final termination of these
proceedings.
It is respectfully submitted that Celsius' Petition for
Rehearing be denied.

- 10 -

Respectfully submitted this fl&C
^

<

day of March, 1992

Anthony iT^tfampton
FABIAN & tLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents
ALR:030392A
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